Illiberalism exported – Hungarian kin-state politics

Building Viktor Orbán’s illiberal democracy profoundly affects not only domestic politics but transnational relations with Hungary’s ethnic kin in neighboring countries. If the intensity of trans-border politics is driven by the degree of democratization within the kinstate (Koinova 2013) and domestic competition (Waterbury 2010), democratic backsliding and curbed political competition allows Orbán to use kin-state politics to cement his personal rule, both within and outside of Hungary. Examining the developments of Hungarian kin-state politics targeted at the Hungarian community in Romania, I argue that post-2010 Hungarian kin-state policies serve primarily the extension of Orbán’s patronal politics, in which political authority centers on a single patron controlling an elaborate system of rewards and punishments. This way, illiberalism is ‘exported’ via homeland nationalism: support is conditional on loyalty – disabling political competitors, local minority media is taken over by Fidesz cronies to promote illiberal propaganda and external citizenship is limited at gratitude votes. This way, political and material intervention by the Hungarian state for the kin-abroad becomes a reward mechanism available only via personal connections. Financial support for minority education, culture or political representation is available solely for supporters of the regime. Local patronage networks are replaced with a trans-border network, topped by Orbán himself. Political competition is canceled out even within the minority community, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) – the minority ethnic party that managed to maintain a monopoly of the Hungarian vote in Romania ever since regime change – now receives more financial support from Hungary than Romania. Similarly, the extension of kin-state citizenship and external voting rights are meant as pay-back avenues for minority members, to receive gratitude votes in exchange for the support received. In addition, control of minority media is key as illiberalism aims at political closure and suppressed dissent. Hungary-funded regional newspapers and media outlets in Romania spread Fidesz propaganda and fake news, while criticizing the Romanian government and aim at creating an ethnic parallelism (Kiss and Kiss 2018) in which Hungarian communities live their life in Romania as if they were part of Hungary. This way, Hungarians in Romania become isolated not only from the remaining political opposition in Budapest but also larger Romanian society, becoming part of the illiberal regime, readily supporting Orbán, portrayed as the only protector of diaspora interest.