Does the realist method lead to novel (realistic) norms in content?

Much of the recent discourse on realism has revolved around methodological issues. As a result, the stakes of the entire project are somewhat hidden from view. These stakes concern the question of what exactly is entailed by realists’ claim according to which the actual practice of politics places constrains on political philosophy. Indeed, surprisingly little has been said about what these constrains are. We aim to fill in this gap in the literature. We argue that there is a close connection between issues of method on the one hand and issues of content on the other. For in order to identify possibilities for construing novel norms for politics – which would be of a distinctively ‘political’ character as opposed to ‘moralistic’ ones – one has to examine the method of their construal in the first place. While there are few systematic approaches to method in the realist literature (cf. Jubb 2017), there is nevertheless a common thread. Namely, the essence is that one ought to begin with an assessment of the objective peculiarities of politics (e.g., Sleat 2016; Burelli – Destri 2022). For example, realists take disagreement and conflict to be such peculiarities and therefore conclude that any political philosophy aiming to provide useful guidance in the real world will first have to prioritize the provision of order over justice, and second, abandon any attempt to enforce a particular comprehensive moral doctrine in society. But not all realists focus on the same objective peculiarities. While many emphasize the relevance of political conflict, securing order in society, or the importance of legitimate coercion, others focus on the contextual demands of legitimacy, the truth value in ‘legitimation-stories’ and instrumental norms. We take these suggestions in order to see in what ways they depend on realism as a method and whether they actually follow from a method-level shift within normative theory. Our approach differs from accounts that question the possibility of a realist normativity in general from a ‘moralist’ point of view (Erman – Möller 2021; Leader Maynard – Worsnip 2018) inasmuch as - by way of an internal reading - it is an attempt to contrast realist method with the norms allegedly follows from it. In a way, the distinctiveness of the entire realist project depends on the answer to this question. Only if it turns out that differences in method (compared to ‘moralistic’ theories) lend support to novel norms in content will the distinctiveness of the realist approach be confirmed. Otherwise, the debate on method becomes somewhat self-referential.