Do epistemic asymmetries have to lead to epistemic dependence? Two approaches in contemporary democratic theory

Epistemic asymmetries are one of the main issues studied in social epistemology. Their relationship to epistemic dependence, usually considered a direct consequence of asymmetries, is particularly problematic (Hardwig 1985, 1991; Nguyen 2020). Researchers look for opportunities to overcome epistemic dependence in various strategies for solving the novice/2-experts problem (Goldman 2001; Coady 2006, 2012; Collins, Evans 2007, 2017). In political theory, on the other hand, the issue of epistemic asymmetries is discussed in complete isolation from epistemic dependence. The problem of asymmetries is debated here in the context of citizen ignorance, post-truth, political manipulation or information bubbles. However, an in-depth reflection on the inevitable epistemic dependence between experts and laypeople must be included (Holst, Molander 2018, 2019; Krick 2020; Grygieńć 2023). My paper will analyse two contemporary accounts of deliberative democracy from this angle: the epistemic version of deliberative democracy (Landemore 2012, 2013; Estlund 2008; Benson 2021) and the concept of deliberative systems (Mansbridge 2012, Parkinson 2012). Both theoretical models see epistemic asymmetries as the source of democracy's strength and hope for aggregating socially dispersed knowledge (Benson 2018). However, they openly ignore the dangers of epistemic dependence. This paper will show that this is possible by adopting a weak version of the relations linking epistemic asymmetry and dependence. It will also discuss the most controversial elements of this approach.