Foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, and quasi-foundationalism: A defence of Rorty on human rights

Rorty’s dismissive attitude to human rights has raffled many feathers in the philosophy of human rights community. In the only paper he ever wrote on human rights, Rorty famously and brusquely (and somewhat impolitely) claims that the search for human rights foundations is both ‘irrelevant’ and ‘outdated’. He also dismisses the role of rationality in moral philosophy, and human rights in particular, as overrated, suggesting instead a new approach to human rights discourse grounded on the role of sentimentality. In this paper I will argue that attempts to counter Rorty’s argument against foundationalism have not been convincing, with the result that Rorty’s thesis is stronger today than it was 30 years ago. In particular, I will focus on John Tasioulas’s attempt to counter Rorty’s position by separating human rights ‘foundations’ from ‘foundationalism’. Tasioulas argues that Rorty presents a parody of foundationalism, which can be dismissed simply by distinguishing foundationalism from foundations: one can make the argument that human rights have foundations (contra Rorty) without falling victim of foundationalism. I will argue that Tasioulas attempt to separate human rights foundations from foundationalism fails, which reflects on the enduring validity of Rorty’s critique of human rights. I will also argue that it is wrong to dismiss Rorty’s position on human rights as anti-foundationalist, although it may seem that way. Instead, Rorty’s views on human rights can best be captured by the idea of quasi-foundationalism, which offers a very attractive and original new perspective on the nature and justification of human rights.