Normative Behaviourism and the Political Theory of Climate Change

Normative behaviourism can be described as a bottom-up approach to political theorising: according to its proponents, normative political theory should be conducted by looking at, and making normatively relevant, patterns of behaviour, instead of patterns of thought (i.e. mentalism). Following NB, we should regard as normatively authoritative those political arrangements and reforms that have historically acquired real acceptance by large numbers of people. For this reason, NB attributes a key normative relevance to insurrection and crime as kinds of behaviour able to signal which political arrangements should be avoided or reformed and, correspondingly, which political arrangements should be considered desirable to pursue. Albeit appealing―as NB manages to bring politics back at the centre of normative political theory and avoids both the dangers of mentalist (top-down) methodological approaches in political theory and their normative impotence―I argue that NB (along with other bottom-up forms of political theorising) might turn out to be an inadequate method for political theory because unsuitable for addressing and examining the political theory of climate change (CC). I explain that the problem of CC―given its unique and exceptional features―represents a stress test for the methods of political theory. NB seems challenged by CC for three reasons. First, as Stephen Gardiner (2006) points out, our ability to tackle the problem of CC is affected by ‘moral corruption’: given its urgency and the radical reforms that are required to tackle CC, people (and institutions) cope with CC by avoiding the problem, rather than enacting the necessary measures to contain it. So, when CC is considered, looking at the behaviour of actual people, as NB suggests, might not tell us much about what should be done, or might bring us in the wrong direction. Second, as shown by COP26 agreements, current liberal democracies, which NB advocates, given the short lifespan of their governments, are in many respects inadequate to enact the required reforms to tackle CC. Yet, NB lacks the theoretical tools to recognize or criticise such shortcomings. Third, since CC has not given rise to widespread bottom-up responses in the form of insurrections or crime yet, NB seems unable to tell us much about what should be done concerning the politics of CC. NB, I argue, is a methodological tool able to tell us something about the political reforms required and desirable to tackle CC when it is too late to address the problem. Should, then, ‘mentalism’ be considered a better methodological approach to address the problem of CC in political theory? I explain that mentalism cannot be an adequate method for a political theory of CC given its failure to provide action guidance in political contexts and properly ‘political’ answers to normative dilemmas. Rather, I advocate for a methodological approach for a political theory of CC in which both mentalist and behaviourist tools play a role. As I show, both mentalist and behaviourist techniques are required to come up with political judgments for addressing CC that are at one time progressivist and responsible.