Surrogate representation in a comparative perspective: Theoretical and empirical challenges

Comparative research of theoretical concepts often brings unexpected empirical challenges. Such is the case of a recent development in representation theory – Jane Mansbridge’s concept of surrogate representation. This concept highlights that citizens may be represented “by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship—that is, a representative in another district” (2003, 522). Normatively, Mansbridge theorizes surrogate representation as compensating for the lack of representation for voters whose candidate lost in their own districts or voters whose preferred policies attract a minority in their districts. Inspired by- and conceived within the American political context, surrogate representation focuses on territorial-based representation by an individual representative. Recent theoretical developments of this concept and empirical studies that explored it had similarly focused on individual representatives, mostly in the American context. However, surrogate representation is developed as a general concept – rather than an American one. Indeed, the setting for surrogate representation may be different, and thereby, also its implications for the constituent’s representation. For example, Wolkenstein and Wratil (2021) observe that in other electoral systems, the voter may have had the opportunity to vote for the surrogate representative but chose not to. What are the implications for the relationships between the voter and her representatives- elected and surrogate? This paper takes up theorizing surrogate representation beyond the American context and maps the empirical challenges in studying it comparatively. First, it highlights the limitations of the American context for creating a general theory of surrogate representation. Then, I discuss the manifestations and implications of surrogate representation in other electoral systems (mixed and proportional) and by non-individual representatives (i.e., parties). Drawing on these, I suggest that a surrogate representative can add dimensions or issues to representation by the elected representative, and not only compensate for a deficit in representation. Mapping the empirical challenges of studying surrogate representation from a comparative perspective, I utilize empirical evidence to demonstrate different pathways for surrogate representation in different electoral systems. I show that proportional systems usually have a larger number of parties, providing more opportunities for surrogation, whereas majoritarian systems incentivize insincere voting. I further identify two effects of surrogate representation by parties- a compensating effect for voters with no electoral representation and an additive effect for voters who have both electoral and surrogate representation. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between electoral and surrogate representation in different contexts.