Counterprotest that emerges in response to far-right mobilization often starts out as an attempt to build broad coalitions that mobilize large and diverse crowds. These efforts, however, do not always succeed. On the example of the xenophobic PEGIDA movement in Dresden and its LEGIDA branch that emerged in Leipzig shortly after, this article asks why the counterprotest in Leipzig was much more effective both objectively and in the perception of its protagonists. Based on an in-depth comparison of counter-mobilization dynamics in the two cities, we identify three factors whose presence in Leipzig facilitated broad and strong counter-mobilization while their absence in Dresden hampered attempts at resistance: a city identity conducive to mobilization shared by a substantial part of the citizenry, a civil society experienced at coalition-building, and support from political elites. Based on expert interviews with observers and activists, document analysis, and a large, original protest event data set we show that these three factors do not function as variables independent of each other but interact to produce substantively different city contexts in which the chances for successful countermobilization strongly differ.
