Risk imposition and the duty to know

Many of our actions involve imposing risks on others, some are harmless, some permissible, some are prohibited. What makes certain risky actions impermissible? The literature offers several explanations, some based on the impact of our actions on the wellbeing of others (material or psychological) or on some other people’s interests (such as autonomy or freedom); other explanations focus on the conative or epistemic status of the risk imposer. This presentation discusses the epistemic status of the risk imposer. Normally, risk imposition is a byproduct of actions aimed at obtaining some benefits and without intention of harming others. On the one hand, the intention of doing harm, in itself, does not make an action wrong and, on the other hand, the absence of the intention is not excusatory of a harm. Instead, the considerations of the risk imposer in forming the intention seem to be relevant. Some of these consideration are of epistemic nature. Are they any duties to acquire information about the magnitude of risk attached to one own’s actions? What do risk imposers ought to know about risk? These questions will discussed by examining a case concerning risk in the workplace, with reference to the TyssenKrupp steel plant in Turin, where 8 workers lost their life. The CEO was accused of failing to adopt the appropriate safety measures and - foreseeing the occurrence of the event - of accepting the risk of death of the employees. The discussion of this case will bring out some important considerations about responsibility for risk, and the ways in which rules and institutions can ensure that the permissibility or impermissibility of risk taking is not left to the subjective epistemic status of the risk imposer, but is regulated according to some intersubjective standards of risk and safety.