The two-sided gap: A longitudinal analysis of mass-elite congruence on European integration, 1979 – 2017

Despite notable exceptions, it is commonly assumed among scholars that the traditional stance displayed by both voters and politicians with respect to European integration progressively gave way to the emergence of a progressive attitude’s misalignment between the two from the 1900s onwards. Within this new socio-political context, several studies relying on different methodologies and data showed how this ‘sleeping giant’ eventually gave rise to the notorious mass-elite ‘gap’ on European integration. Thus, despite the hindrances concerning the possibility to reach a systematic understanding, the literature at-large managed to prove how the political elites tend to present a pro-EU bias, which in turn contrasts with the rather contentious attitudes of the public opinion when it comes to the EU and European integration. Given these premises, the present study aims to offer two main contributions with respect to the present topic. Firstly, it seeks to address the aforementioned deep-rooted assumptions of the literature by conducting a longitudinal mass-elite congruence analysis on European integration at the supranational level spanning from the first direct European elections to the late 2010s. The primary objective of this endeavor rests on the opportunity not only to confirm or refute the presence of this ‘gap’, but also to observe its evolution over time. Indeed, many authors focusing on mass-elite congruence at the supranational level mostly relied on single surveys, while longitudinal studies are relatively fewer in number. In this sense, this study aims to offer a more wide-reaching investigation that might be able to observe the attitudinal shift of voters and politicians from the golden era of the ‘permissive consensus’ to the ongoing phase of ‘constraining dissensus’. Secondly, the research intends to investigate mass-elite congruence by examining pro-European and Eurosceptic voters and politicians, thus seeking to verify whether or not the aforementioned mass-elite ‘gap’ is present when separating the two opposing views on European integration. This is of paramount importance especially in light of the progressive mainstreaming of Euroscepticism, a phenomenon that began with the ratification of the TEU and reached its apex in the aftermath of the Great Recession. In order to fulfil this goal, the paper relies on various elite and voter surveys (EES, IntUne, EUENGAGE, EPRG, ENEC, Eurobarometer), analyzing data from nine specific points in time (1979, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2007, 2009, 2014, 2016, 2017). Initially, the study will descriptively analyze the results of the data through mass-elite congruence via a many-to-one analysis. Successively, a series of regressions will be conducted in order to confirm the trends shown in the descriptive section. Through these undertakings, the present study expects to both confirm the presence of this ‘gap’ and establish how it changed over time. When it comes to the pro/anti-EU dimension, finally, the research expects pro-European public opinion to be less integrationist than pro-EU politicians, while Eurosceptic voters should tend to be more integrationist when compared to their politicians.