After the euro crisis, the European Parliament (EP) has become the central accountability forum in EU economic governance. Despite extensive research on the new scrutiny powers and political dynamics of oversight in the EP, there remains a gap in our understanding of the representative aspect of its accountability activities in the context of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this paper, we aim to address this gap by exploring the extent and conditions under which members of the European Parliament (MEPs) represent transnational constituencies in their legislative oversight of EU economic governance.
Our study is based on a theoretical framework that integrates theories of legislative and representative behavior. To capture dynamics across different types of executive actors, we focus on the EP’s regular Economic Dialogues with the European Commission, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), and the Eurogroup in the 8th parliamentary term (2014-2019). We conduct a representative claims analysis of 1,073 oral parliamentary questions on EMU governance to examine the influence of individual characteristics, party political and country-level factors on MEPs’ transnational representation. Our research sheds light on the critical role of the EP in ensuring accountable and representative governance in the EU.
