Misinformation is increasingly a pressing security problem that has attracted the attention of scholars and policy makers. Different types of counter-disinformation strategies have been proposed and tested in a growing number of studies. The findings from these studies, however, are limited to predominantly North American and Western European contexts where ordinary people are recipients of mis- or disinformation. There is a considerable gap in our understanding of the susceptibility to mis- and disinformation among closed communities like state security forces and, broadly speaking, the political elites. To remedy this problem, the aim of this study is twofold: 1) examine the susceptibility of Czech members of armed security forces to misinformation, and 2) in this context, test the effectiveness of two types of counter-disinformation strategies: prebunking and persuasive communication that focuses on patriotism. To this end, we present a survey experiment of several hundred officers from Czech state security agencies, including the police and border services. The results will offer an evaluation of the resilience of Czech security forces to misinformation and suggest ways forward to increase this resilience in the broader context of hybrid threats.
