Saving the Internet: (When) Are Digital Platforms Successful With Outside Lobbying?

Existing studies on the relation between business power and digitalization have identified a new type of power specific to digital platforms. Platform power is rooted in the platforms’ centrality to users’ lives. Because regulation does not only restrict the platforms but also the downstream activities of its users, consumer and platform preferences tend to align. As a consequence, vote-seeking politicians shy away from platform regulation in fear of public backlash. While the argument is straightforward, neither the power of platforms to mobilize users in direct comparison to other businesses or interest groups nor the limits of platform power are empirically studied. Therefore, this paper asks two interlinked research questions: (1) do platforms have a structural advantage over other interest groups when using outside lobbying? And (2) Under which conditions does platform power translate into actual influence on legislation? Linking the platform power literature with work on outside lobbying, I sketch out a causal mechanism that emphasizes the strategic element of user mobilization. I argue that platforms enjoy a privileged position for user mobilization because their business model provides them with a direct channel to reach a big group of dependent users. Although they can use this channel to increase issue salience and (re)frame the discourse on legislation their influence ultimately depends on three factors. Whether (1) their attempts to increase salience are successful, (2) their frames are relatively uncontested in the public debate, and (3) institutional factors shield policymakers from public pressure. I empirically investigate the mechanism and its potential breaking points by combining process-tracing and text-as-data methods in a deviant-typical case study design. I compare the EU Copyright Directive of 2019 (EUCD) and the US Stop Online Piracy Act of 2012 (SOPA), two copyright laws aiming to increase the liability of platforms for copyright infringements. Both laws initially faced little opposition until platforms started a substantial outside lobbying campaign. While the platforms' campaign led to the failure of SOPA, the EUCD passed. Using a dictionary approach, I trace how the frames pushed by different interest group types influenced the public debate on twitter and in leading newspapers as well as tweets, speeches, and votes of legislators. I find that issue salience and pro-platform frames indeed increased disproportionally after platforms began to use outside lobbying. While the change in discourse lead Congress to shelf SOPA, platforms were unable to influence the EUCD for two reasons: (1) strong counter-frames delegitimized the platforms position among the public. And (2) a fragmented public sphere within the EU created different nationalized rather than an EU-wide pro-platform discourse. For instance, in Germany pro-platform frames dominated that depicted the EUCD as promoting censorship and breaking the internet. In France, in contrast, the EUCD was primarily discussed as tackling market power and promoting the fair remuneration of artists. These national discourses were largely reflected in the tweets, speeches, and votes of European legislators. My findings contribute to a better understanding of interest group strategies and influence, and their interaction with (supra)national institutions in the digitalized world.