No Mere Autocratic Axis: Unpacking Russian Support for Assad's Regime Through the Frame of Patron-Client Relations

This paper aims at unpacking and analysing Russia's support for Assad's regime during the Syrian conflict (2011-present), through the lens of Patron-Client Relations (PCR). Scholarship on Russia in/and Syria suffers from three main limitations. First, it is relatively limited. Academics and experts have paid scarce attention to Russia’s relations with and intervention in Syria — instead preferring to delve into other topics — e.g., the Georgia and Ukraine wars, Moscow’s power networks in the post-Soviet space and relations with other great powers. Second, and related, the relationship between Moscow and Damascus is frequently simplified to a partnership among autocrats, and 2015’s Russian intervention gets boiled down to a bombastic move aimed at thwarting Western policies in the Middle East (and Europe). The complexity of Russia-Syria relations and the nuances of the Russian decision-making process are widely disregarded. Third, the few scholarly works that do try to unpack such aspects are empirically rich but fail to frame their analyses in solid theoretical frameworks. This leaves plenty of room for deepening research conceptually. This paper addresses the aforementioned limitations by employing the conceptual lens of PCR, in order to gain a fuller understanding of 3 interrelated aspects. First, the motives that brought Moscow and Damascus together to counter the effects of the ‘Syrian Spring.’ In particular, why did Moscow provide not only political, but also military, all-out support to Assad’s regime? Second, the type of resources exchanged by Russia and Syria, and the dependency-control dynamics characterising their relation. The analysis will highlight the ‘immaterial’ interests of Russia and the struggle of both parties to not be trapped into the relationship. Third, the degree of success, as well as the long-term sustainability of Russia’s patronage of Syria (or, flipping sides, Syria’s client-like relation with Russia). By doing so, this paper will contribute not only to a deeper comprehension of the nuances, critical junctures, and limits of the Russia-Syria relationship — but also to the theoretical refinement of the PCR frame, through application to a state-on-state, military-heavy case.