Can Political Elites Avoid Affective Polarization? Evidence from Canadian Politicians

Politics in developed democracies is rife with growing hostility among opposing partisans (Boxell et al., 2020; Gidron et al., 2020; Westwood et al. 2018). This mass-level animosity across partisan lines, commonly called affective polarization, is on the rise globally (Hetherington et al. 2016; Huddy et al. 2018; Lelkes 2016; Levendusky 2018; Mason 2018; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017) and has been associated with diminished trust in government and discrimination against out-partisans (Carlin and Love, 2018; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; McConnell et al., 2018). While elected politicians are typically seen as a major source of affective polarization (Bandaa and Cluverius, 2018; Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Stapleton and Dawkins, 2022), existing literature is almost exclusively focused on the measurement and explanation of affective polarization among citizens (Enders, 2021). As a result, we know far less about elite affective polarization – the degree of partisan hostility held by elected politicians. This is a concerning empirical gap: first, because elite behaviour and speech is a central driver of mass affective polarization, and second, because affective polarization creates a strong partisan bias in scenarios that require cooperation, in bargaining and negotiations, and in material allocation decisions (Carlin and Love, 2018; Iyengar and Westwood, 2015), all of which are central to the legislative tasks that elected representatives are required to perform. If politicians are as affectively polarized as citizens, or even more so, this might have negative implications for how legislatures and governments function, for policy outputs, and for how satisfied citizens are with what elected officials are able to accomplish for them (Iyengar et al., 2019). Understanding the size and sources of affective polarization at the elite level is thus a pressing priority for scholars of polarization in developed democracies. In this paper, we explore whether affective polarization persists among political elites even in the absence of political institutions that incentivize partisan animosity. We do so by leveraging the distinctive institutional setting of Canadian municipal elections, using an original survey of 700 sitting local politicians to explore how variation in local institutions (partisan vs. non-partisan elections) and local politicians (partisan vs. non-partisan, ideological extremist vs. moderate) shapes elite affective polarization. Our findings clarify the extent to which non-partisan or quasi-partisan local institutions can avoid selecting affectively polarized political elites, the conditions under which partisan hostility among elected representatives thrives, and the types of political elites who are most susceptible to affective polarization. Together, they chart a research agenda rooted in local politics that explores how partisan affect fosters cooperation and antagonism in elected bodies, and how those in turn translate to policymaking outcomes.