A rational account of parliamentary behaviour supposes that the reactiveness of parliamentary representation to on-going events varies according to electoral incentives and especially electoral laws and cycles. Following the concept of ‘media storm’ developed by media studies, we suggest that in case of major shocks suddenly affecting the whole society, political attention may massively shift independently of specific electoral incentives. It is only when the shock is passed, after the storm, that electoral strategies may be distinguished through the difference of behaviour of the majority and the opposition.
Oral questions related to Covid-19 asked in the low assemblies of France, Germany, Ireland and Israel since early 2020 offer a unique opportunity to test this theory given the saliency of the shock provoked by the pandemic but also its duration and fluctuation through times. Beyond discussing the relevance of the electoral and political storm approaches, a key stake of the comparison consists in assessing the degree and rapidity of parliamentary reactiveness in an age of crisis of confidence towards legislatures.