The Vices of a Bad Voter

Under “normal” circumstances, an individual “bad” voter does not impose (undue) risk - the probability that a harmful vote would be decisive is simply too small. This does not, however, intuitively provide a ground for denying that there is something wrong in voting “badly”. If it is my probability of affecting the outcome, which is close to zero, that has moral saliency, why may we still think that I do something wrong if I vote ignorantly or irrationally? The kind of epistocrats who proclaim restricted voting argue that it is wrongful for voters to make irresponsible use of their right to vote. There is, however, a lack of compelling moral theories for such wrongfulness. Without a thorough examination of such theories, and how well they fit the framework of bad voting and wrongness in voting, we cannot conclude with any certainty that individual “bad” voters act wrongly. This paper examines the epistocratic claim of individual “bad” voting as intrinsically wrongful, even when the effects of such voting is insignificant. It will focus on virtue ethics because any theory of democracy must provide at least some description of what citizens actually do when they exercise their political rights, such as the right to vote. Furthermore, such a description must assume that there are some virtuous way(s) of exercising such rights, and that some ways are not virtuous, but – as I shall call them - viceful. Using virtue ethics, the following argument has been construed, and the objective of this paper is to test whether this argument holds. • P1: You ought not be morally and epistemically viceful when acting • P2: To vote badly, is to act morally and epistemically vicefully • P3: At a certain point, moral and epistemic vicefulness ought to be restricted • P4: To restrict individual bad voters’ right to vote, is a way to counteract moral and epistemic vicefulness C2: At a certain point, viceful voters’ voting rights ought be restricted The paper concludes that even though premises 1 and 2 seem to hold, the rest of them do not. Most probably, to restrict voting rights would diminish at least one incentive to learn, nurture, and maintain virtuous being and acting. Plausibly, the effect would be reversed. The conclusion, thus, is not valid – instead, something seems to be missing from the epistocratic argument, namely ways to promote phronesis (moral and practical wisdom) – Virtue Education 2.0.