Hate thy neighbor like my party does? Negative appeals in elite communications and affective polarization in multiparty systems

Evidence of an increasing hostility towards partisan out-groups, also labelled affective polarization, has grown in recent years, as have studies examining its potential roots and consequences (Iyengar et al., 2019). Although mostly focused on the US bipartisan context, a growing body of literature finds that sustaining negative misperceptions of the out-group, as well as a growing feeling of anger towards the out-party, are greater predictors of affective polarization towards out-party supporters than party identification, partisanship, or issue position (Garrett & Bankert, 2018). Moreover, recent studies suggest that political campaigns, and negative advertising in particular, may fuel affective polarization, because of the constant portrayal of out-groups as a threat, the exaggeration of perceived tensions between parties, and the consistent emphasis on political partisanship (Michelitch & Utych, n.d.; Sood & Iyengar, 2016). We build on these findings by examining the role of negative appeals in elite communications on affective polarization outside of campaign periods in multiparty systems. Theoretically, we draw from the mechanism of affective learning to examine if exposure to a negative appeal from an in-party politician towards the out-party increases one’s negative feelings towards supporters of this out-party. We also explore whether this effect is stronger or weaker when the targeted out-group is of moderate or extreme distance from the in-party on the political spectrum. Additionally, we draw from the theory of elite position adoption to test whether different types of attacks (issue based or ad hominem), different degrees of incivility, and different issue mentions in these appeals have differential effects on affective polarization. To analyse the relationship between political attacks and affective polarization, we conducted an online survey experiment in Flanders (Belgium) in the fall of 2021 (n=2.547). We find that those exposed to a negative appeal scored consistently higher on both measures of affective polarization compared to the control group. However, the regression analyses testing the effects of being exposed to a civil versus an uncivil attack, or a personal versus an issue attack, or a moderate out-party versus extreme out-party attack on affective polarisation, did not show any statistical differences. Finally, the effect of being exposed to an attack on affective polarization was stronger among those exposed to an attack targeting an extreme out-party compared to those exposed to an attack targeting a moderate out-party. These findings advance the current literature by uncovering effects of negative appeals in politicians’ communication and political attacks on affective polarization outside of campaigning periods. This study shows that negative elite communications could be another driver of affective polarization regardless of the degree of incivility or the topic of the attack, which has several implications for political communication research: most importantly, it confirms and stresses that the use of negative campaigning tactics in elite communications play a role in the erosion of social cohesion, everyday interactions, and relationships. Second, our findings suggest that, in multiparty systems, affective polarization is not only omnipresent on the political spectrum but can also occur between partisans of moderately distanced parties, and therefore of moderately distanced ideologies.