The missing piece of elite research: Ministerial careers and constitutional rules

Elite studies that examine the determinants of ministerial careers have predominantly focused on two major theoretical approaches. The first approach highlights the effects of the institutional framework, particularly the role of political parties, prime ministers, presidents, and voters on ministerial careers. The second examines the individual-level perspective of contenders and ministers on the costs and benefits of holding a cabinet position, among the others, the influence of scandals, popularity, and individual resources on the individual’s desire to assume and hold a ministerial position. Although both approaches have their own merits, they also have shortcomings. The latter approach stresses individual perspectives and largely neglects the effects of the institutional setting in which politicians make their career decisions. The former approach stresses the importance of institutional setting. However, it places the significant determinants at the meso-level of the political system ignoring the macro-level factors such as constitutional rules. This paper shows that such fundamental institutional settings as constitutions matter for ministerial careers. They frame the overall setting in which elections occur, parties select candidates, and ministers make their career decisions. This paper shows the specific effects of constitutional rules on ministerial careers using a sample of European countries since 1945.