This article investigates how authoritarian regimes select ruling elites, focusing on the case of government cabinet members in Morocco, an authoritarian monarchy. Drawing on data collected on the biographical characteristics and political careers of cabinet members between 1956 and 2016, I argue that non-parliamentary monarchies are less subject to the dilemma that arises in authoritarian contexts when appointing ministers between political competence and loyalty to the regime. The results indicate that elites with political competence are appointed to technical ministries, while ministers loyal to the monarchy are given cross-cutting ministerial portfolios to monitor the activities of non-loyal ministers. However, this portfolio design is only effective when the regime is politically stable and not threatened by rebellion. On the contrary, when the regime is contested, either internally or externally, ministers with political competence, such as party leaders, tend to take precedence over government members with ties to the royal family. This result suggests a strategic use of government design by the monarchy to enhance its survival and avoid betrayal by its government members. This article expands the literature on the loyalty-competence trade-off, which has focused primarily on non-monarchical authoritarian regimes with indeterminate rules of succession that may favor loyal ministers as a precautionary measure.
