The Virtues and Vices of Contestation for Public Discourse

In a recent proposal, Bernard Manin (2017) has claimed that desirable public discourse should be about (adversarial) debate, not discussion. According to Manin, adversarial debating improves the quality of collective decisions, counteracts the fragmentation of the public sphere, facilitates the comprehension of choices, and treats the minority with respect. However, conceptualizing public discourse in terms of fully-fledged argumentative contestation is at odds with popular understandings of deliberation. Many contemporary deliberationists view deliberation as an “essentially cooperative venture” with the aim of finding common ground with others (Goodin 2018). Even John Dryzek, a pioneer expanded notions of deliberation, has declared (2009: 3): “Deliberation is different from adversarial debate. The initial aim is not to win, but to understand.” In this paper, I try to sort out how desirable public discourse should (and could) look like. I argue that while contestation is indeed an oddly under-appreciated element in deliberative theory, its virtuous effects are contingent as well as dependent on appropriate conceptualizations of contestation. I first argue that confusion about the proper role of contestatory vs collaborative modes has to do with insufficient conceptional work. Regarding constestation, I will distinguish between two conceptions, namely an oratorical and a deliberative one. The oratorical conception has “heresthetical” features and mainly aims at mobilizing (and “manipulating”) its audience; by contrast, the deliberative conception tries to marry the essential ingredients of adversarial debating – the intentional mobilization of controversy - with a (minimal) deliberative approach stressing both the production of robust reasons and (a modicum of) reflexivity and open-mindedness. Second, contra Manin, I suggest that contestation is no panacea for achieving desired democratic outcomes. Drawing from a “problem-based” understanding of “deliberation” (Warren 2017), I begin with various functions of public discourse and inquire what various forms of communication –with a key focus on contestatory and collaborative ones - can contribute to these functions. I distinguish between an epistemic function (the creation of “better knowledge”), an ethical function (the creation of common understanding, transformation towards common ground, and trust) and democratic functions (the production of accountability and consequentiality as well as the securing of inclusion, especially of marginalized voices) (see Mansbridge et al. 2012). I argue that contestatory practices have in-built mechanisms (exposure to maximum criticism) for unleashing some essential epistemic properties - in-depth thinking - as well as to enhance some democratic functions of public discourse (inclusion, accountability, and politicization). However, contestation in itself – also in its deliberative variant - may be a blunt and incomplete tool liable to misfire. Third, I will show that collaborative communication modes also possess mechanisms (“principle of charity”) to realize specific epistemic goals, namely broad thinking. Moreover, collaborative modes are in a better position to realize the ethical and some democratic aims of public discourse. Fourth, given the fact that no communicative practice is in a position to achieve the various functions of public discourse (epistemic, ethical and democratic) in totality, the various communication modes must be ´mixed´ and ´staged´.