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Fundamentalist Belief and Cognitive Radicalization

Extremism
Political Ideology
Theoretical
Rik Peels
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Rik Peels
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Abstract

How do extreme beliefs relate to extreme behavior? Recently, it has been acknowledged that to understand how certain beliefs or ideologies are linked to violent, militant, or terrorist behavior, we must engage the subjectivities and beliefs of extremists and terrorists. But what are extreme beliefs, such as fundamentalist or extremist beliefs? And how do extreme beliefs conceptually relate to cognitive and behavioral radicalization? In this paper we develop an account of fundamentalist beliefs, and explore the conceptual relation of ‘fundamentalist belief’ and ‘radicalization.’ Fundamentalist beliefs are often discussed in relation to extremist, radical, or fanaticist beliefs, or terrorist ideology. However, the conceptual links between these notions are unclear. What is more, fundamentalist beliefs are frequently defined and operationalized (for example in the field of psychology) but there is no uniform way of doing so. Despite the frequent recurrence of the term ‘fundamentalist belief’ in the literature, no clear and agreed-upon definition exists. Elements and characteristics that are commonly thought of as constituting fundamentalist beliefs are intellectual vices such as closed-mindedness or dogmatism, certain group dynamics and affections, a high degree of certainty in holding these beliefs, and fundamentalist content. Drawing on, among other things, recent developments in (social) epistemology, these alleged elements are critically reviewed. Based on this review, we develop what we call the Reaction-Content-Affect account of fundamentalist belief. This account, it is argued, is not only accurate, precise, fair, and clear, but also theoretically and practically fruitful. On the basis of this account, we turn to the conceptual relation between ‘fundamentalist belief’ and ‘radicalization,’ zooming in on the relation between fundamentalist belief and cognitive radicalization. We conclude by sketching various ways in which cognitive radicalization might be understood in light of our analysis of fundamentalist belief. (The abstract is meant for the panel 'motivational beliefs and political violence' in the section 'Political Violence'.)