De-sovereignisation as an instrument of Russia’s conflict resolution strategy in the context of post-Soviet de facto states. The cases of Transdniestria in Moldova and the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Eastern Ukraine 

This paper introduces the idea of ‘de-sovereignisation’ as a new way of conceptualising Russia’s involvement in post-Soviet de facto states – territorial entities having de facto but lacking de jure sovereignty, the creation and survival of which rely on Russia as the patron state. De-sovereignisation is defined as the process(es) through which a state facilitates state- and nation-building practices that interfere with another state’s ability to exercise control and authority over portions of its territory and population, that is, administer parts of its internationally recognised jurisdiction. Spanning policy domains, these processes operate as means of diplomatic pressure: they gradually help de facto states acquire various attributes of sovereignty and statehood, thereby weakening those of their respective parent states, in turn making them more vulnerable to Russia’s interference. Focusing on Transdniestria and the Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics (DPR/LPR), this paper examines the ways in which the official rhetoric and diplomatic initiatives promoted by de facto leaders and Russian officials ‘de-sovereignise’ Moldova and Ukraine. It comprises four parts. The first part illustrates how de facto states challenge conventional definitions of ‘sovereignty’ and how de-sovereignisation processes are equally informed by Russian elites’ understanding of state interests and their beliefs about sovereignty. The second part analyses de facto authorities’ public statements and programmatic documents. These indicate the aspiration to obtain international recognition and integrate with Russia. This aspiration clashes with Russia’s official diplomatic position for these regions to be granted autonomy and reintegrated into their respective parent state through a federative arrangement to be embedded in the two countries’ constitutions. Constitutional enshrinement would maximise Moscow’s efforts to influence Ukraine and Moldova from within. Russia can position itself as a mediator in rather than a party to both conflicts by portraying them as civil wars. Urging central authorities in Chisinau and Kyiv to negotiate directly with the de facto leaders helps Moscow elevate the international political status of Transdniestria and the DPR/LPR. The third part investigates Russia’s diplomatic engagement with the de facto governments through the signing of bilateral cooperation agreements and the establishment of representation offices. These initiatives add a new level of complexity, given that formally Russia refuses to recognise these entities as independent states (though this may change). The fourth part explores the paradox underlying Russia’s role as the patron state. Integration processes with Russia successfully alienate these regions from their parent states as a destabilising mechanism in the short-term. Over time, the local population is forced to reorient itself towards Russia. However, the deeper integration processes with Russia grow, the less feasible reintegration plans become, paradoxically obstructing Moscow’s strategy to create a ‘state-within-a-state’ arrangement for Transdniestria and the DPR/LPR to its advantage. Moreover, practical challenges connected to the lack of international status may exacerbate local grievances and weaken the legitimacy of the de facto leadership, with important implications for the success of de-sovereignisation as an instrument of Russian diplomatic pressure. This case-study analysis draws on state documents, news articles, video content and semi-structured interviews with officials and experts.