Political violence to party politics: the strategic imperative of electoral politics for militant Irish republicanism

Political parties associated with armed groups are often characterised as cover organisations or mere mouthpieces; secondary and auxiliary components of militant movements which are driven above all by military imperatives. In many conflict situations however, the political wings of armed groups have made a full transition to conventional electoral politics with considerable success while the armed wings have faded away. This is represented by many analysts as an unanticipated outcome; movements are represented as being forced into electoral politics. This paper, in contrast, treats the successful transition to electoral politics as a strategic imperative for armed groups. It examines the tensions and balance between armed force and political activism in managing this transition for militant Irish republicanism during the Northern Ireland Troubles from the late 1960s to the 1990s. The paper is based on interviews, archival research, newspaper research and an analysis of the discourses surrounding electoral politics in republican publications and key speeches. The paper argues that the movement was driven from an early stage by the strategic political imperative of ending its armed campaign and making a successful transition to electoral politics. It considers the implications of this case for understanding the use of violence by non-state armed groups and the role of party politics in their strategic choices.