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Scientific policy advice in times of crisis – comparing the financial crisis, the Fukushima accident, and the Covid pandemic

Policy Analysis
Public Administration
Knowledge
Decision Making
Caspar Hirschi
Universität St Gallen
Caroline Schlaufer
Universität Bern
Johanna Hornung
Université de Lausanne
Céline Mavrot
Universität Bern
Fritz Sager
Universität Bern
Caroline Schlaufer
Universität Bern

Abstract

This article examines how scientific knowledge was channeled to policymakers in three different crises in Switzerland: the financial crisis, the Fukushima nuclear accident, and the Covid-19 pandemic. In recent years, governments have established institutions and processes to facilitate the use of scientific knowledge in policymaking. These science-for-policy mechanisms were, however, not always designed to channel scientific knowledge to policymakers in times of crisis. Crises are characterized by epistemological uncertainty and a high urgency to take decisions. The proposed paper draws on over 20 interviews with representatives of the Swiss public administration, government, and scientific community to investigate the use of scientific knowledge in the three different crises and to evaluate the observed science-for policy-mechanisms using criteria based on the concepts of input, throughput, and output legitimacy. Switzerland’s institutional setting with its neo-corporatist features, semi-direct democracy, and strong federalism favors democratic decision-making based on input legitimacy over technocratic decision-making based on evidence. The comparison of the three crises shows how pre-established science-to-policy mechanisms in the financial, nuclear, and health fields differently reacted to the crises. Preliminary results suggest that, in the financial crisis, scientific knowledge generated inside public administration was used in a technocratic decision-making process that enhanced output legitimacy, whereas in the nuclear field, established scientific advisory bodies were consulted but political decision-making and input legitimacy prevailed. During the Covid-19 crisis, the pre-established scientific advisory body and knowledge internal to public administration were replaced by an ad-hoc scientific task force that was created by members of the scientific community acting, at first, as issue advocates. While technocratic decision-making prevailed in the beginning of the pandemic, the prolongation of the crisis witnessed a change towards political decision-making and a questioning of the legitimacy of scientific advisors. In conclusion, the article discusses options for crisis resilient and legitimate science-for-policy mechanisms. To be included in a panel on the organization and institutionalization of the nexus between science and politics.