Crisis is a period where experts can play an influential role in guiding through uncertainty, provided that they have an access to decision-makers. Eurozone crisis starting in 2009 could have been a time to re-evaluate the existing European Monetary Union (EMU) economic rules and policies. Thus, it is vital to study which experts filled the expertise and evidence gap facing a new situation in the early stages of the crisis. During this pivotal turning point, they had a potential to exercise power by advising decisions that guided the crisis resolution in a path dependent manner.
This PhD monograph chapter analyses the role of the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank experts in the eurozone crisis decision-making during the spring 2010 negotiations leading to the first Greece loan package and the European Financial Stability Fund. It traces who were the key experts that EU decision-makers relied on in these negotiations and what kind of knowledge regime was created. It illustrates the role of experts in the absence of an austerity focused EMU paradigm change that fuelled Euroscepticism and populism.
The analysis was based on official documents and statements, as well as on a unique set of 127 interviews with EU decision-makers and Member States officials from Finland and Germany.
