The Politics of Weak Discipline: Enforcement of European Fiscal Rules and Budgetary Policies in France

The euro area crisis led to a strengthening of budgetary rules in the EMU and the institutionalization of budgetary surveillance at European and domestic levels. In France, the budget is controlled by the European Commission, by the High Council for Public Finance, and also by the Court of Auditors. However, this paper claims that, notwithstanding this threefold fiscal oversight, French governments kept significant leeway in budgetary policymaking between 2012 and 2020, finding ways to circumvent European rules and avoid a strict budgetary consolidation. The case study aims to interrogate the institutional design of fiscal surveillance institutions and explain how, and for what purposes, successive governments were able to retain room for budgetary manoeuvre. It explores in doing so the specific characteristics of French post-crisis fiscal policy and sheds light on institutional logics and rationales framing budgetary choices. The paper draws on an in-depth analysis of institutional documents, semi-structured interviews with officials, and press analysis.