The Rules of the Foreign Policy Game: How EU Member States Bargain in CFSP/CSDP Negotiations

EU foreign policy negotiations present unique characteristics that set them apart from other policy areas, as the issues under discussion are closely related to vital domestic interests and may strike at the heart of the contemporary Westphalian state. Consequently, not only is there a level of rigidity to member states’ positions that we do not see in other policy areas, but secrecy and informality assume even greater prominence. Moreover, compared to other policy areas, the domestic coordination circle is tighter and reaches higher political levels faster. Developing a set of hypotheses that capture the unique nature of EU foreign policy negotiations, the proposed paper investigates how member states go about defining, defending and adjusting their positions in CSDP/CFSP negotiations. Relying on an original dataset collected by means of elite interviews and a survey completed by EU officials and national diplomats, the paper focuses on three sets of CFSP/CSDP negotiations: the agreement on the three-staged sanctions regime against Russia, the launch and implementation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the adoption of Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI. Among other things, the paper shows that, in a context in which member states rely heavily on informal capital-to-capital coordination outside of the institutional EU framework, the unofficial roles that member states can claim for themselves (such as that of broker or penholder) help account for their negotiation success.