Towards a European Rapid Reaction Force ? Lessons from the European Union Battlegroups : the case of France

Since 2021, plans to create a European Rapid Reaction Force have been debated again. Driven by a new enthusiasm, it is necessary to take advantage of the previous experience of the European Union battle groups (EUBG) in order to avoid the same mistakes. Created by the member states of the European Union in 2004 to be the armed wing of the EU, the EUBG have so far never been used, after more than fifteen years of existence. Several reasons have since been given to explain this situation: the complexity of the decision-making process within the European Union; the lack of will to use on the part of many governments, etc. This paper aims to analyze the attitude of the French governments on this issue and more particularly while French troops were part of the EUBG on standby in Mali 2013. The aim here is to check whether the decisions taken by the French administration/government correspond to the reputation of Paris and to understand why these decisions were made. In order to analyze and explain these decisions, we will use in this proposal an analysis model combinig the theory of roles of Kal Hoslti and elements of the decision-making approaches. Our research and interviews tend to show that the decisions taken by the French government can be explained in the light of the roles for their country in which the actors of these same decisions fit. Power relations and conflicts can eventually reduce the scope of roles. However, it is only through these roles and by taking into consideration the real actors of each decision that a satisfactory explanation can be provided for the decisions taken. This model makes it possible to explain the reasons behind the recurrent refusal among the involved members of the French administration/government to use the GTUE.