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Implementation is the hardest word: demystifying the (non-)compliance to European Union acquis in Georgia

European Union
International Relations
Domestic Politics
Policy Implementation
Michel Anderlini
Malmö University
Michel Anderlini
Malmö University

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Abstract

Numerous studies, using the Europeanization theoretical framework, have looked into why and how EU-supported and policies are adopted in non EU-Member States, focusing either on the mechanisms through which they are diffused or on the local actors´ responses to such demands. However, the practical implementation of such norms and policies in third countries has only received modest attention in academic and policy-related studies. Indeed, as argued by Versluis (2004), the “law in the books” is not necessarily the “law in action”. Building a bridge between Europeanization, compliance and policy transfer studies, this dissertation argues that once adopted, EU norms and policies continue to be negotiated, adapted and resisted upon during their implementation phase. Based on interviews with both EU and Georgian experts involved in Twinning projects, this article aims to uncover the mechanisms behind successful and less successful compliance with the EU acquis in twelve policy areas, covering both hard and soft law. The article argues that the politicized nature of public administration is likely to affect the most the degree to which EU law is implemented in Georgia. Revising the distinction made by Bondarouk, Liefferink and Mastenbroek (2020) between the management approach (by which insufficient norm implementation depends on the implementers´ capacity to do so) and the political approach (by which insufficient norm implementation depends on the implementers´ willingness), the article´s empirical findings show that in policy areas where the domestic government has vested interests, the administration is more likely to be characterized by reduced administrative capacity, higher degree of staff turnover and show less policy saliency, which negatively affects compliance with the EU acquis.