The end of the Cold War posed a significant challenge to the dominant theories in International Relations. Most, if not all scholars are familiar with the narrative: the Neo-paradigms failed to predict or account for the fall of the Soviet Union. Lost to a significant degree in the academic and real world turmoil of the end of the Cold War was the reunification of Germany. As a consequence, the ramifications of the reconciliation of East and West Germany for the study of international security, foreign policy analysis, and IR theory in general have been overlooked. Making use of newly available, previously classified British archival documents, we distill the essential logics of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism and examine their role in shaping the understandings policymakers held of German reunification. We find that while all these theoretical logics help shape the policymaking surrounding reunification, none stand alone as a basis for understanding social reality. Realist logics highlight lingering suspicions of Germany’s neighbors about the country and its role despite 40 years of development for the European security community. The importance of institutions, and the perceived strength of these institutions apart from the balance of power, is consistent with Neoliberal institutionalist logics. Constructivist logics highlight the importance of shared democracy in establishing a peaceful European system with Germany at the heart as well as the importance of identity in shaping the behavior of states. In the final analysis, bringing to bear these three perspectives highlights the complexity of German reunification, the dilemmas created as different logics co-mingle in a single policy space, and the importance of breaking free of the strictures of the ideas versus materiality debate.
