Far-right Radicalization on Telegram? A Longitudinal Analysis of QAnon and Identitarian Movement Online Communication during the COVID19-Pandemic

Societal crises give rise to societal instability and thereby create a fertile ground for radicalization and extremism (Funke, Schularick & Trebesch, 2016). The global pandemic in 2020 has generated a great level of societal uncertainty. Extremists tap into such crises by distributing disinformation and conspiracy narratives to amplify feelings of uncertainty and distrust among the public. People with a sense of uncertainty and existential fear are more receptive to radical voices and conspiratorial thinking (Rieger et al., 2020). First studies of pandemic related, politically biased news content confirm this by showing that extremist actors distribute content that “contribute[s] to a contradictory, menacing, and distrusting worldview” (Boberg et al., 2020, p. 1). Due to extensive account removals by large social media platforms, far-right actors increasingly rely on instant messaging platforms, like Telegram, for undisturbed communication within their communities (Rogers, 2020; Urman & Katz, 2020). We investigate whether far-right communication in less regulated digital spaces indicates radicalization dynamics concerning prevalence and severity of conspiracy myths. To analyze communicative changes throughout 2020, we compare two far-right movements (Identitarian Movement, QAnon) and study their communication in ten high-reach Telegram channels employing quantitative and qualitative content analysis. To examine long-term shifts, we collected data for three time periods between March and December 2020 during which political regulations were specifically salient. This resulted in ~7 Tsd posts, of which 1216 were selected randomly regarding time and movement. The content was coded manually for several types of conspiracy narratives, political participation, and degree of violence. Overall, neither the prevalence of conspiracy narratives nor the severity of violence increased significantly over time in either of the movements’ communication: ~26-32% of the Identitarian Movement’s posts and ~26-38% of QAnon channels’ posts reference a conspiracy myth. The high salience of conspiracy myths only decreased in August/September - during this time, we find the highest number of calls for political participation. While the intensity of calls for political participation differ between on- and offline participation, we find that the Identitarian Movement calls for political participation (48%) far more frequently than QAnon (28%). The calls for violence increase slightly over time (~13%-17%), however neither the increase nor the change in severity are significant. These preliminary results are surprising and contrast popular belief as well as previous research of crises’ consequences. One possible explanation could be that the saliency of the investigated themes is already at such a high level in these far-right communities that it is difficult to find significant changes. On the other hand, radicalization dynamics are usually most present in fringe communities (Zannettou et al., 2018; Guhl, Ebner & Rau, 2020). Therefore, a second explanation could be that more violent communication takes place elsewhere, e.g. in closed groups on Telegram. Further analyses to be presented at the conference will include additional channels and groups to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the specific communicative mechanisms.