I have previously argued that in new democracies intense political competition hinders, rather than promotes the development of independent courts (Popova 2010, 2012). I have proposed a strategic pressure theory of judicial independence, which explains differences in the level of judicial independence in increasingly competitive Ukraine and increasingly uncompetitive Russia during the late-1990s and early 2000s. Ukrainian incumbents, who faced a realistic chance of losing office in the next election cycle, chose to politicize a much greater number of court cases and exerted sustained pressure on judges. By contrast, Russian incumbents, whose re-election was virtually guaranteed, left more wiggle room for courts to deliver unbiased decisions (Popova, 2010, 2012).
Further research has confirmed the predictions, as well as some of the mechanisms of the strategic pressure theory in other country and temporal contexts within the FSU region. Specifically, post-colored revolution Ukraine and Georgia have maintained a high level of political competition and sustained efforts by incumbents to politicize justice and pressure the courts to deliver favorable rulings (Trochev 2009, 2010).
The next logical step in the empirical testing of the strategic pressure theory is to check whether its claim is generalizable beyond the post-Communist region. This is the main objective of this paper. I use data from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions to operationalize the main independent variable, political competition. I use Kaufmann’s Rule of Law Governance Indicator data to measure judicial independence.
The analysis supports the predictions of the strategic pressure theory. It demonstrates that political competition hinders the development of independent courts in new democracies but this relationship is gradually reversed as democracies mature, so that political competition is beneficial to the rule of law in consolidated democracies.
