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Should there be a Right to Leave the EU? Connecting the Right to Exit and the Duty to Enter in the Theory of Multilateral Democracy

Citizenship
Democracy
Brexit
Demoicracy
Antoinette Scherz
Stockholm University
Antoinette Scherz
Stockholm University

Abstract

Brexit has been framed as both a victory of democracy over a technocratic regime and a loss of democracy and rights on the European level. The recent debate surrounding Brexit has focused on specific normative issues such as the democratic value of the referendum process or the rights of EU citizens residing in the United Kingdom or vice versa after Brexit. This paper addresses the more fundamental normative question of whether there is a right to exit the EU normatively speaking. It discusses this question on the basis of multilateral democracy (or demoicracy) as an ideal theory for the EU. Multilateral democracy is a voluntary association between several democratic peoples. From this perspective, however, it is important not to over-simplify the concept of people or its “will”. First, the paper argues against the so-called ‘affected-status view’ advanced, in particular, by Tore Olsen and Christian Rostbøll. They have argued that unilateral withdrawal from the EU is undemocratic. This view is unattractive for several reasons, most prominently as it ignores the normative relevance of existing democratic peoples and reduces the debate about democracy in the EU to relations of individuals. Furthermore, the all-affected principle results in a dilemma. On the one hand, the general all-affected principle leads to a normative demand for a global state, potentially even forcing states to become members. On the other hand, the all-affected status principle tries to avoid this conclusion leaving it up to the states to access to a union, but it prohibits exit. This would make it unattractive for states to enter. Second, the paper outlines multilateral democracy as a more attractive alternative, highlighting how the concept of a voluntary association relates to the right to exit and duties to enter the multilateral union. In this regard it considers the questions of democratic reversibility and ‘ratchet effects’ to discuss whether certain democratic achievements should not be reversible in multilateral democracy.