This debate, I believe, pivots around the ontological status of ‘causal mechanisms’. The added value of process-tracing lies in searching for the causal mechanisms or ‘pathways’, which connect specific causes to specific effects. In their landmark study George and Bennett (2004) seem to opt for a scientific-realist approach: Causal mechanisms are ‘out there’ waiting to be tracked down and ‘traced’. Constructivists consider them to be ‘socially constituted’. A a lot of cloudbusting tends to surround discussions on causality in social science. Claims made by either side do not seem incommensurable and many of the supposedly new insights are not out of line with what the likes of Hume, Hayek, Popper and Lakatos have stated about it. This paper thus tries to answer two questions. Are rationalist and constructivist claims concerning causality really that different? And do any of these differences matter for what we are doing at the methodological level? In short: Do we need to build bridges or is there already more than enough common ground?
