Endorsement, Wellbeing, and the Non-Specific Value of Freedom

Hybrid theories of wellbeing have increasingly gained the philosophers’ attention. According to such theories, wellbeing is composite: it has both an objective component (the attainment of objectively valuable goods) as well as a subjective component (endorsing or having a positive attitude towards the valuable goods in question). A number of liberal theorists (Dworkin, Kymlicka, Raz) have emphasised that hybrid accounts incorporate a central liberal premise about the good life: the idea that the attainment of valuable goods cannot contribute to wellbeing if one feels alienated from it (e.g. if one rejects it or does not endorse it). The aim of this paper is to examine the relationships between the subjective component of wellbeing and negative freedom through a discussion of Serena Olsaretti’s views on this matter. The analysis of Olsaretti’s arguments contributes to shed light on different senses in which freedom has non-specific value for the fulfilment of the subjective component of wellbeing. And this in turn advances our understanding of the claim that freedom has non-specific value and of the connections between such a value and personal goodness (i.e. wellbeing).