Survivability conditions of partially independent territories

Under what conditions do partially independent territories tend to sustain themselves and under what conditions do they tend to come to an end? This paper will discuss how sustainability or termination of such unions between core states and partially independent territories are a function of perceptions of fairness with regard to the division of power and mutual benefit. The differences in power between core states and partially independent territories are perceived as justifiable and fair as long as the core state is able to furnish an attractive set of public goods. However, as the economic capacity of the core state and the partially independent territory increasingly equalizes, the inequality in the distribution of power becomes increasingly unsustainable. This paper will therefore illustrate how most partially independent territories that have terminated have done so when the core state has a GDP that is less than ten times the size of its associated partially independent territory. The paper will discuss some arguable trends and policy options for a number of different partially independent territories that are currently below or near this termination tendency point (including Hong Kong, Scotland, Catalonia, Vojvodina, and the Kurdish Territories).