Saving Parties from Money

Money works its way around all aspects of the democratic process, but its role is particularly noticeable in political campaign, often seen as the democratic moment par excellence. Through elections citizens put candidates in power and give the initial fiat to the steering of government. Through political campaign candidates (compete to) put themselves on citizens’ ballot paper. There are different democratic values at stake in a political campaign (Lipsitz 2004) and more importantly there are various political actors involved (i.e. individuals, parties, corporations, unions and non-profit corporations), as well as multiple ways in which money can influence electoral results (Christiano 2012). In this chapter I will take into consideration two ways money affects political campaigns, which Tom Christiano calls “gatekeeping” and “influence on public opinion”. Money acts as gatekeeper when it grants paying individuals or entities the opportunity to set the agenda by funding candidates, thereby having them more responsive to their interests once in office. On the other hand, it influences public opinion when it allows paying individuals or entities to broadcast their opinions to the public more extensively, thereby making them more visible in the public sphere. Although different in principle, the two phenomena are intertwined and both need to be dealt with because they represent a possible distortion of the democratic process. What kind of regulation of contributions and expenditures, if any, should we aim for? While this question has usually been answered bearing in mind political equality and freedom of speech, this chapter addresses it from the point of view of political parties. Empirically, a political party is a form of association that contests elections (Sartori 1976). Normatively, a party must also present other core features: accepting pluralism and with it the legitimacy of other parties as competitors (Urbinati 2019) and providing a policy platform that systematises values and interests in a coherent and generalisable way (White and Ypi 2017). Furthermore, parties in the democratic setting must also organise themselves democratically and be themselves fora of discussion and debate (Wolkenstein 2016). In this chapter I aim to argue that these core features of political parties provide a further reason, beyond political equality, in favour of capping both direct and indirect private contributions to parties and candidates, i.e. money given directly to candidates vs. independent expenditures for political communication for or against candidates. Contrary to other organisations, political parties are meant to have a certain vision of the common good and to be structured democratically. By allowing any kind of unlimited independent expenditures, both the epistemic and motivational role that parties play in democratic life, as well as their internal democratic structure, would be jeopardised. Unlimited direct contributions make party competition unfair, insofar as certain parties are better equipped to share their agenda. Unlimited indirect contributions, however, are even more dangerous because they threaten the internal democratic structure of parties. If political parties are necessary to our democracies and provide a distinctive outlet for the right of free speech, as I argue, they ought to be protected.