Deliberation Under Clear Majorities – The Case of Parliamentary Decision-Making

This paper investigates the role deliberation plays in parliamentary decision-making. The deliberative quality of collective will-formation is pivotal in current discussions in democratic theory. According to deliberative democratic theory, legitimacy rests on the way in which political positions are developed and decisions are made: This process should be as inclusive, justificatory and rational as possible. While this normative perspective has instructed a growing body of empirical literature on the quality and effects of deliberation in democratic processes, research has focused mainly on democratic innovations and rather seldom on institutions of representative democracy such as the parliament. Looking at parliamentary deliberation confronts us with a striking puzzle: Although parliaments normally have procedural rules that decelerate decision-making and foster deliberation (such as public debates, readings, hearings, committee transferals, etc.), they are regularly governed by clear majorities that exist before any deliberation takes place. This is especially true within parliamentary systems (but to a lesser extent also for presidential systems) and limits the expectations for parliamentary deliberation right from the outset. Against this backdrop, the paper asks what role deliberation plays under these conditions? Does it have any potential effects or does the deliberative procedures boil down to an inconsequential ritual? The paper theoretically and empirically investigates this problem through a case study of the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag). In a first step, it presents a theoretical model that takes the specific context of parliamentary deliberation into account. The basic argument is that the behavior of MPs and party groups are guided by two prevalent logics of action: a positional logic that rests on party orientation and representative relations, and a discursive logic that is guided by underlying formal and informal deliberative norms that are based on parliamentary procedures and respective expectations. The varying balance between these logics in the course of different legislative processes determines the respective communication strategies of MPs and party groups which then potentially result in specific effects of deliberation. Four types of potential effects are identified: coordination, learning, reaction, and takeover. In a second step, the paper presents empirical evidence for these theoretical claims based on observations and expert interviews with about 40 members of the German Bundestag, who have been asked to report their knowledge and experience regarding their communicative behavior and its effects. The paper concludes with a reflection on the implications of its theoretical and empirical contribution, and on next steps to further explore the dynamics and profiles of parliamentary deliberation in other democratic systems.