Authoritarian Party Presidentialization and Regime Change: a Party Politics Perspective on Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Hungary and Turkey

Compared to abrupt forms of regime change, contemporary forms of authoritarianism emerge as a culmination of more subtle mechanisms (Bermeo 2016). Several seminal studies uncovered the subtle ways by which aspiring autocrats change the democratic institutions from inside to eliminate checks and balances to their rule and amplify their power vis-à-vis the opposition. Nevertheless, much of this literature gives only a passing attention to how parties- as organizations- change from being a possible initial gatekeeper for undemocratic intrusions to infrastructural power houses (Slater 2003) at the service of aspiring autocrats. In view of that, this paper aims to bring a party politics perspective to ongoing debates on the emergence of contemporary forms of democratic backsliding and autocratization by revisiting the concept of presidentialization (Poguntke and Webb 2005). Notwithstanding the scholarly debate it has generated so far and arguments on its implications for party government model, the relationship between presidentialization and autocratization continues to remain an unexplored field of inquiry. To better understand the changing organizational characteristics of incumbent parties prior to and under the processes of democratic backsliding, this paper will introduce authoritarian mode of presidentialization. Despite its similarities regarding the electoral and executive faces of presidentialization introduced by Poguntke and Webb (2005), authoritarian presidentialization differs from it on its party face. In its original variant, party face of presidentialization entails a process of increasing mutual autonomy of party leadership and party organization from each other and the former’s increasing power resources vis-à-vis the latter (being contingent on his/her electoral appeal). As distinct from such a mutual autonomy (between the leader and the party), authoritarian presidentialization entails a process by which the party leader dominates the entire party organization which leads to a unilateral autonomy of party leader from the party organization. As a culmination of this process, the party organization rather than being an initial possible frontier against an aspiring autocrat, becomes an infrastructural powerhouse that amplifies his/her power. Through a comparative case study design (most different similar outcome) including Fidesz in Hungary and Justice and Development Party in Turkey, this paper will test the empirical validity of authoritarian presidentialization and the mechanisms through which it leads to democratic backsliding and autocratization. As agents of democratic backsliding and autocratization in their countries, both parties’ genetic codes (Panebianco 1988) differ to a large extent. Despite this prominent difference, the organizational trajectory of both parties follows similar paths which makes the cases of Hungary and Turkey particularly interesting to understand party-specific mechanisms of autocratization and testing the empirical validity of authoritarian presidentialization.