Asymmetry as the Backbone of Contemporary Federalism

Constitutional asymmetry indicates that the component units of a federal system do not have uniform relationships among each other and towards the central/federal government. In traditional federal theory, asymmetry is considered as an exception, both in quantitative and in qualitative terms. Not only is asymmetry considered exceptional, but it is also seen with great suspect, as it is seen – explicitly or implicitly – as a driver for disunity and possibly disintegration of the federal polity. Conversely, symmetry is understood as an integrative factor. As a consequence, strict interpretation of asymmetric rules and processes of symmetrisation and unitarization are often the prevailing approach to deal with differences. The paper challenges this approach by contending that the opposite is true, namely that asymmetry is the key rule and the key motive of contemporary federal processes. Asymmetry is not only a mechanism for diversity management, but also the prime instrument of holding-together federations, which are all federal systems created over the last century. It is contended that the wrong approach to asymmetry is caused by a partial reading of the very definitional elements of asymmetry, such as the legislative powers and a structural fear that asymmetry might contradict the unity of the system. To the contrary, it is argued that many other factors contribute to the asymmetric design of territorial settings, such as financial regulations, forms of representation in the national bodies, rules of supervision and control of acts, legal guarantees, international relations. In conclusion, some reflections are made as to how possibly reconcile asymmetry and unity, which is calls for a «secular», unbiased reading of federalism and autonomy in general.