Allotted Chambers as Guardians of Democracy

The rise of extremist political movements has fuelled the search for new mechanisms to safeguard democratic institutions. Existing mechanisms are often decried as either too legalistic (courts) or too partisan (parliaments). Courts lack democratic legitimation, while parliaments pose the risk of tyranny of the majority against unpopular and vulnerable minorities. These considerations suggest the need for protective mechanisms that enjoy strong popular legitimacy, but without repeating the failings of existing democratic institutions. We suggest that randomly-selected assemblies might effectively serve as citizen tribunals enforcing anti-extremist measures. Random assemblies respect inclusion and political equality through their selection procedures, thereby providing a strong form of democratic legitimation. In addition, properly-designed random assemblies can ensure impartiality; they are not bound to follow a partisan agenda and resist capture by political elites. We conclude by imagining three different roles –weak, moderate and strong– that allotted chambers can play in the process of democratic self-defence.