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Abstract
China’s increasing global engagement has made it an ever ‘closer’ actor to the Mediterranean area. As for other bordering states, it is now a significant economic partner for Spain. The multidimensional development of their bilateral relations has been institutionalized by the signature of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2005, later revised in 2018 during President Xi Jinping visit in Spain. Economic relations have notably expanded in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, when China became a salutary export market at a time of looming internal demand. China also appeared as a welcomed financial partner – a source of FDI and an international lender – partly mitigating Spain’s financing difficulties. To date economic relations remain Spain’s priority focus, all the more because of significant room for improvement. Nevertheless, Spain’s promotion of enhanced ties does not come without conditions, with an increasing demand for more balanced and equitable relations, and an emphasis on a much needed level-playing field.
In that respect, Spain’s position echoes France and Germany – and the European Commission’s – call for a coherent and unified position towards China and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This indeed represents an evolution, as Spanish authorities used to be more willing to bilaterally engage with China while they now consider that their bargaining position benefits from coordination with main EU players. Hence, the refusal to endorse the initiative though a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding unlike other Mediterranean (EU) countries like Greece, Portugal or Italy, due to the BRI’s normative and economic shortfalls, mainly a lack transparency and openness.
Spain also appears to stick with the cautious, but inclusive, European approach regarding 5th Generation cellular networks (5G). In the EU, Spain has been very proactive in developing 5G, not least thanks to the cooperation with Chinese firms like Huawei. But it has not remained indifferent to the European strategic turn. While excluding to formally ban Huawei from critical infrastructures, Spain is looking for supply diversification, especially in core technology. Notably, Telefonica is expected to remove Huawei technology from its 5G core to replace it with a multi-provider architecture. Further, Spain seems increasingly supportive to European industrial policies and potential European technological consortiums to better compete with China and other foreign countries.
Ultimately, China’s geopolitical engagement draws a triangular scheme with indirect but crucial impact on Spain-US relations. While the United States remain a privileged economic partner and ally, Spain, like other EU countries, would resist to disengage from China. In fact, rather than containment (or rapprochement) with China, triangular interactions are pushing Spain even closer to the EU level with a preference for European integration and strategic autonomy, the more effective way to address the challenges posed by China, and preserve Spain’s interests in an evolving international order.