China’s Projections in the Maghreb: Establishing a Presence in the Mediterranean

China’s longstanding and complex relations with the Maghreb have been alternatively characterized as both ideological and pragmatic, and both mercantile and developmental. China has made inroads in the Maghreb in recent years, raising concerns among Western politicians and academics. Indeed, China has become active in this Mediterranean region through strategic engagement by focusing on bilateral relations while also working within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF). Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, China has great interest in the Maghreb as an entry point to European markets. In general, China’s approach focuses on commercial relations over political influence. Until now, despite important commercial exchanges with China, the Maghreb states are still dependent on their former colonial power, France, and the European Union, which exert great political, economic, security and cultural influence. Although China has become Algeria’s main trading partner, surpassing France, and despite a long-standing overall relationship, whose culmination was the comprehensive strategic partnership (2014), China has had limited geopolitical and security roles in the region, reluctant to play a mediation part in the conflict in Western Sahara or the civil war in Libya. This paper analyzes the evolution of China’s political, economic, military, and cultural relations with the Maghreb States, a major part of the Mediterranean that has attracted foreign powers. It discusses the trajectory of China’s vicissitudes in its foreign policy, namely from radical, ideological principles in the 1950s-1970s to pragmatism since 1978. It focuses on China’s attempts to include the Maghreb countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Notwithstanding their dependence on Europe, the Maghreb countries’ economic relations with China have grown exponentially, with Algeria forming the closest relationship. However, Morocco and Tunisia have been keen to attract China’s investment and involvement in major construction and infrastructure projects to boost industrial and economic development. Politically, especially since the ‘Arab Spring,’ China’s policy of noninterference in domestic affairs has appealed to Maghreb states. Moreover, the paper examines how each Maghreb state has interacted with China and highlights the incongruities between the BRI’s stated objectives and the geopolitical realities. Through scrutinizing China-Maghreb relations since the 2011 uprisings, the paper provides a deeper understanding of China’s foreign policy objectives and their limitations. Using the Maghreb as an example, the aim is to determine whether China’s emergence as a global power and its presence in the Mediterranean represent a new approach to international relations (“win-win cooperation”) or, is driven by the long-standing logic of neorealist power politics (J. Mearsheimer) and capitalism (in its commercial form). This raises a related question as to whether the Maghreb intends on playing China against Western powers or whether the Maghreb states are interested merely in commercial gains from China. Contrasting neorealist and constructivist approaches will help shed light on these questions. This research paper draws from dozens of interviews with Chinese and Maghreb scholars and officials.