(Un)evenly Distributed Futures? Concerns for Absolute Versus Relative Gains in the Governance of Artificial Intelligence in the European Union, the United States, and China

According to neoliberal institutionalism, the “shadow of the future” prompts states to care about absolute rather than relative gains in interstate relations, which raises the prospects for cooperation among states. Structural realism, on the other hand, holds that the anarchic state system incentivizes the pursuit of relative gains, which increases the likelihood of conflict among states. However, as a game theoretic model shows, whether states care about absolute or relative gains hinges on the constraints they face; relative gains should become primary concerns only when they alter states' ability to successfully use force – and if the use of force is actually at issue because the costs of fighting are low (Powell 1991, 1994). Based on this framework, the paper hypothesizes that the EU, the US, and China will behave cooperatively in the governance of artificial intelligence, except where direct military applications are concerned and the first condition is consequently fulfilled. The paper tests this contention by analyzing relevant policy documents, announcements, investments, and agreements among the three countries over a ten-year period.