Defection within the ruling elite often endangers the authoritarian rule, paving the way to a democratic transition. Recent studies view defection to the opposition as an elite strategy to advance political careers and power. As a result, the ruling elite is said to share a mix of goals and weigh opportunities similarly, such as economic crisis, political reforms or leadership succession. Using a novel dataset on the political career of legislative deputies and ministers in Yeltsin’s Russia, this paper develops and tests hypotheses on how elites defect to the opposition. The theory predicts that elites respond to opportunities to defect differently based on the type of political resources that they command. Ruling elites tend to defect early in the term and towards existing opposition groups when the ruler bestowed few resources upon the politician – such as leadership positions within the regime. A low stature within the ruling coalition hinders the elites’ capacity to secure regime benefits, while it makes these elites dependable on another side to achieve political goals. Thus, the ruler risks that losers in the distribution of key offices can empower existing challengers. Besides status, the resources that elites bring to the ruling coalition also matter – such as the control of political machines, business connections, and knowledge. Those with many autonomous resources tend to respond earlier to incentives to defect and stand as independents or create new political parties. This evidence leads to a tradeoff in the area of elite recruitment: the ruler would like to gain the support of resourceful elites to govern effectively, but they are the first to betray the regime when chips are down. In short, results highlight tensions between the ruler’s strategies to repel challenges and the composition of the ruling coalition.
