Islamists’ Moderation Through Inclusion in Institutionalized Dialogue with the European Union? The Cases of Tunisia and Egypt.

The question what accounts for diverging paths of political change in the Muslim world and Tunisia’s model character is often answered with reference to Ennahda’s ideological transformation from a fundamentalist to a “Muslim Democrat” party. Its moderate behavior and willingness to make concessions in Tunisia’s political crisis in the summer of 2013 have saved it and the country from tensions with rivaling forces that in the case of Egypt led to the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi. This raises the much-discussed question in the comparative literature why some Islamists moderate while others do not. Explanations have so far omitted influences that arise out of Islamists’ conduct of foreign policy. The aims of this paper are therefore twofold. In a theoretical perspective, it brings together insights from studies on the international dimension of democratic transitions with the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. The former can inspire the latter when it comes to specifying the proposed dichotomy between behavioral and ideological moderation that still remains unclear even as the inclusion-moderation hypothesis experiences a revival since religious parties in the Muslim world have succeeded at the ballot box. In an empirical perspective, Tunisia’s and Egypt’s Islamist actors represent cases in point to illustrate such mechanisms since both Ennahda as well as the Muslim Brotherhood have been included in the EU’s institutionalized political dialogues in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy after their electoral victories in 2011. Drawing on interview material with European Union diplomats and domestic political actors, the paper finds that a high degree of inclusion does indeed contribute to the Islamists’ willingness to compromise and endorse democratic values both in diplomatic relations and on the home front. On one end of the spectrum, Ennahda’s socialization into substantial dialogue schemes with European diplomats has backed the open and tolerant positions the party has adopted most notably during the tumultuous year of 2013 leading up to the drafting of the constitution. On the other end, the Muslim Brotherhood’s poor and often erratic use of institutionalized dialogue went hand in hand with an ever more religious ideological stance regarding conflict with other domestic actors such as the judiciary. This dichotomy does not only help to illustrate different trajectories of “Mediterranean Islamism” but also illuminates the added value of the EU’s activities in a shared Mediterranean political space.