The Riskification of EU Energy Governance

This paper will argue that the evolutions witnessed in EU internal and external energy governance can best be understood as results of a succesful riskification process by the Commission, whereby energy imports (mainly Russian natural gas imports) have been framed as risks to the security of supply of the EU. Until the late 2000s, the internal and external policy of the EU were firmly rooted in a market-regulatory paradigm, aimed towards the creation of integrated and competitive energy markets through regulatory tools. In the internal dimension this happened through the gradual establishment of the Internal Energy Market, in the external dimension this was attempted through exporting that Internal Energy Market abroad. This was considered as the best and most appriopriate way to achieve not only a competitive, but also a secure EU energy supply. In recent years, this will paper will argue, the EU's energy governance has been "riskified", on the basis of riskifying moves by the Commission in conjunction with a deterioration of EU-Russia relations. The development of a comprehensive EU framework for selective support towards infrastructure implementation, selective opposition to infrastructure considered contrary to the EU's security of supply-objective, the changing nature of the EU's external energy policy no longer solely aimed towards rule-export, are all part a new riskified paradigm of energy governance. In this riskified paradigm of energy governance, security of supply is no longer solely entrusted to the creation of integrated and competitive energy markets, but is also pursued through the establishment of "precautionary policies" directly aimed towards security of supply, such as the ones described above. These have to ensure security of supply in the face of the risks posed by energy imports, and deviate significantly from the market-regulatory paradigm where regulation was the primary tool and the creation of integrated and competitive energy markets the primary objective. In this new paradigm of energy governance, financial and political support are just as well considered appropriate tools to achieve policy objectives, and the EU no longer only functions as a regulator in the energy sphere, but also as a facilitator, particularly in regards to infrastructure implementation. In this way, the paper tries to contribute to current attempts to go beyond the popular dichotomies in the field (liberal vs. realist, markets vs. geopolitics), which stand in the way of a more profound understanding of the current state of EU energy governance.