Did Parliament Take Back Control? Brexit and Executive-Legislative Relationships

This paper focuses on the institutional conflict between the executive and the legislature in the Brexit process. The traditional ‘Westminster model’ à la Lijphart features a power-hoarding executive which commands a majority in Parliament and, more specifically, in the more influential lower house – the House of Commons. Although recent analyses have called into questions the validity of the ‘pure’ Westminster model to accurately describe the relationship between Government and Parliament, Brexit represents a fundamental catalyst for change. Based on a rationalist-institutionalist approach, this paper argues that Brexit is a ‘window of opportunity’ for the executive to augment its powers, given its role as the key negotiating actor; the tight temporal constraints to conclude the process and its superior resources vis-à-vis Parliament. The balance of power between the executive and the legislature is assessed analysing in depth three ‘critical events’ in the Brexit process: the (notification of) Withdrawal Bill to trigger art. 50; the ‘meaningful’ vote on the withdrawal agreement and the attempts by the House of Commons to take control of the agenda; the prorogation of Parliament by Boris Johnson. Through the in-depth analysis of these cases, based on a wealth of empirical sources and original interviews with policy-makers and civil servants, this paper shows that the image of a power-hording executive controlling Parliament does not stand the test of Brexit. Yet, whether this new balance of power ‘survives’ post-Brexit is open to question.