Aggregative and Deliberative Models of Democracy: Reciprocity as a Consolidating Concept?

Although since the mid-1970s the number of democratic governments has grown worldwide, citizens´ satisfaction with real democracies has dramatically declined. Democratic theory as an academic discipline naturally reacts to this dissatisfaction, both by considering new, innovative versions of democracy or by redefining existing idealized models of democracy. Thus, it is not surprising that the contemporary democratic theory has an overwhelming number of theories, concepts and models outlining how an ideal form of democracy should look like. However, this inflation seems to be counterproductive concerning the fact that democratic theory should provide a clear theoretical framework for both empirical measurements and practical policy-making institutions as well. Hence, the paper presented aims to focus on the two main opposing models of democracy: deliberative and aggregative and propose their conceptual consolidation. Both mentioned models differ substantively in their answers to the question: “What is the aim of democracy?”. While the aggregative model links the goal of democratic procedure to the aggregation of the mutually conflicting individual preferences that are formulated on the basis of self-interest, thus the aggregative democracy is a zero-sum game, the deliberative model rather presupposes that preferences are formed through the process of deliberation itself which - unlike aggregation - aims at reaching the mutually accepted and justified consensus (if possible). This dichotomy is rooted in different metatheoretical presumptions underlying both models, most significantly those related to the capabilities such as agent´s rationality and reasonableness which are linked to the agent´s commitment to follow his/her personal interest or sacrifice them for the sake of group or collective interest. Paper presented aims to illustrate that both models could be consolidated through the concept of reciprocity that can serve also as an answer for problematic parts of both models (problem of ethical-egoism and free-rider paradox in case of aggregative model and the problem of unrealistic prerequisite of altruism and accent on common good in case of deliberative model). Reciprocity lies at the center of a cooperative strategy that has proved to be the most advantageous from the perspective of collective rationality aiming at maximizing personal interests in context of collective decision-making process (prisoner´s dilemma could serve as an illustration), however it is also interlinked to the deliberative demand on reasonableness that presupposes compliance with the deliberative procedure itself. It is precisely the criterion of reciprocity that implies that an individual is not subjected to the unrealistic requirement of absolute subordination of individual interest for the sake of collective good but rather he can maximize its personal interest only through the cooperation that – in a long term – demands reciprocity. Through the concept of reciprocity is this burden equally distributed to all members of the society. Subsequently, communicative procedures laying in the heart of deliberative model in this respect serve as a tool for building and cultivating inter-subjectivity that is a core element for collective rationality and strengthening the inter-agent´s trust in the procedure of cooperation as mutually preferred (and if so, then also beneficial) strategy.