Restricting Party Funding as an Instrument of Militant Democracy

CO-AUTHOR without an ECPR account at the time of submission: Gelijn Molier (Leiden) // In its landmark 2017 NPD-II case the German Federal Constitutional Court - ruling against banning the extreme right NPD party - hinted at a less far-reaching measure in combatting antidemocratic threats: stopping the state funding of antidemocratic parties. The German constitution did not provide a basis for such a measure, but the German constitutional legislator followed up on the suggestion quickly with a constitutional amendment. In doing so, it created an, arguably, more nuanced militant democracy framework. Immediately, however, normative (democratic) concerns were also voiced. Building on earlier work regarding the German situation (Molier & Rijpkema 2018) this paper aims to broaden the view and provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the dual, “hybrid” use of party funding, as an instrument of party support and as an instrument of combatting certain parties (especially those that are particularly dependent on state subsidies, as is the NPD). First, the paper explores the distribution and use of party funding restrictions for militant purposes across different countries. Second, the paper works towards a normative evaluation of the conditions under which party funding restrictions can be justified within a militant democracy framework, next to, or even instead of, party bans.